All eyes are now on the Indian Ocean region

Contact Counsellor

Last Updated20/03/2024

While the Indian government’s focus from January 2021 was fixed on the Indo-Pacific with a sustained endeavour to strengthen the Quad
policy attention has shifted back to the Indian Ocean since October 2023.
Of course, the Indo-Pacific strategy covers both the Pacific and Indian Oceans, but when danger deepens, the immediate neighbourhood matters more than distant shores.

The Maldives, seems to be heading on a collision course with India.
Despite New Delhi’s patience and diplomatic tact, Male continues to deepen its embrace of China.
In contrast, Sri Lanka showed greater sensitivity to India’s security concerns by imposing a year-long moratorium on foreign research ships, including Chinese ones, to its ports.
Last month, India’s SAGAR policy produced a valuable dividend
- as the Prime Ministers of India and Mauritius inaugurated a new airstrip and a jetty in the Agaléga Islands
- boosting Mauritius’s capability to curb illegal activities in its vast Extended Economic Zone.
Both the Western Indian Ocean littered with island nations and the Northern Indian Ocean stretching from the Arabian Sea to the Suez have become active geographies again.
A clear pattern is emerging behind Beijing’s quest for naval bases in Djibouti, Kyaukphyu, Gwadar, and Hambantota.
India and the U.S., he underlined, were key stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region. Cooperation helps them in addressing the strategic competition with China.
Collaboration in underwater domain awareness has been identified as a key goal in dealing with the “emerging” threats.

While they are concerned about Beijing’s illegal claims in the South China Sea, they must see that a similar kind of assertiveness and hostile intent is building up in the Indian Ocean too.
But they display a ‘studied ambiguity’ when it comes to interpreting China’s behaviour and the long-term motivations driving it.
The geographic distance of the European nations from China gives them a sense of security.

First, India needs to convey a clear message to its strategic partners that while it is conscious of its Indo-Pacific responsibilities
- it prioritises the Indian Ocean region.
Second, a critical audit of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) is needed.
While IORA is underperforming and has become too amorphous to be effective, the CSC faces the danger of losing a key member
- the Maldives, if the island nation’s partnership with China deepens.
It may be time for New Delhi to encourage the creation of a new mechanism with the objective of bolstering maritime security and optimizing the potential for the Blue Economy.
This group could comprise four nations from the neighbourhood (India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar) and four island states (Mauritius, Seychelles, Comoros, and Madagascar).
The ninth seat may be kept for the Maldives if it adopts a sensible policy.
This group can be named the ‘Indian Ocean Cooperation Organisation.
As India aims to become the third largest economy, it should find new budgetary resources for its Navy to make it the third or fourth strongest.