All eyes are now on the Indian Ocean region
- While the Indian government’s focus from January 2021 was fixed on the Indo-Pacific with a sustained endeavour to strengthen the Quad
- policy attention has shifted back to the Indian Ocean since October 2023.
- Of course, the Indo-Pacific strategy covers both the Pacific and Indian Oceans, but when danger deepens, the immediate neighbourhood matters more than distant shores.
The policy shift
- The Maldives, seems to be heading on a collision course with India.
- Despite New Delhi’s patience and diplomatic tact, Male continues to deepen its embrace of China.
- In contrast, Sri Lanka showed greater sensitivity to India’s security concerns by imposing a year-long moratorium on foreign research ships, including Chinese ones, to its ports.
- Last month, India’s SAGAR policy produced a valuable dividend
- as the Prime Ministers of India and Mauritius inaugurated a new airstrip and a jetty in the Agaléga Islands
- boosting Mauritius’s capability to curb illegal activities in its vast Extended Economic Zone.
- Both the Western Indian Ocean littered with island nations and the Northern Indian Ocean stretching from the Arabian Sea to the Suez have become active geographies again.
- A clear pattern is emerging behind Beijing’s quest for naval bases in Djibouti, Kyaukphyu, Gwadar, and Hambantota.
- India and the U.S., he underlined, were key stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region. Cooperation helps them in addressing the strategic competition with China.
- Collaboration in underwater domain awareness has been identified as a key goal in dealing with the “emerging” threats.
Besides the U.S., where do the U.K., European Union, France, and Germany stand
- While they are concerned about Beijing’s illegal claims in the South China Sea, they must see that a similar kind of assertiveness and hostile intent is building up in the Indian Ocean too.
- But they display a ‘studied ambiguity’ when it comes to interpreting China’s behaviour and the long-term motivations driving it.
- The geographic distance of the European nations from China gives them a sense of security.
India’s other options
- First, India needs to convey a clear message to its strategic partners that while it is conscious of its Indo-Pacific responsibilities
- it prioritises the Indian Ocean region.
- Second, a critical audit of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) is needed.
- While IORA is underperforming and has become too amorphous to be effective, the CSC faces the danger of losing a key member
- the Maldives, if the island nation’s partnership with China deepens.
- It may be time for New Delhi to encourage the creation of a new mechanism with the objective of bolstering maritime security and optimizing the potential for the Blue Economy.
- This group could comprise four nations from the neighbourhood (India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar) and four island states (Mauritius, Seychelles, Comoros, and Madagascar).
- The ninth seat may be kept for the Maldives if it adopts a sensible policy.
- This group can be named the ‘Indian Ocean Cooperation Organisation.
- As India aims to become the third largest economy, it should find new budgetary resources for its Navy to make it the third or fourth strongest.